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The Role of the Courts in Imposing Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures: 
Normative Duality and Legal Realism 
 
Stuart Macdonald 
 
This article argues that the courts, not the Home Secretary, should be empowered to 
issue Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). It explains that at the 
heart of the debate are three questions: whether measures like TPIMs should be viewed 
primarily from the perspective of security or liberty; how we should conceive the 
executive and the courts; and the empirical question of how these two arms of 
government answer these questions. The non-mechanistic nature of legal reasoning 
means that legal reasons may be constructed to fit one’s normative viewpoint on each of 
the first two questions. Importantly, however, the case law on judicial scrutiny of control 
orders consistently demonstrates that the courts themselves regard TPIMs as being 
primarily a restriction on liberty, which require a fair hearing before an independent 
court. Whilst this does provide some protection of individual rights, the nature of law as 
an unfinished practice means that for stable protection of individual rights judicial 
independence must be promoted and nurtured in both the legal and political realms. The 
failure of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 to vest the 
power to issue TPIMs in the courts thus represents a missed opportunity to secure 
political endorsement of enhanced legal protection of individual liberty in cases involving 
national security. 
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Introduction 
In the past decade political scandals have been a commonplace. In the UK recent years 
have seen the Leveson inquiry’s examination of the relationship between politicians and 
the press, the parliamentary expenses scandal, the cash for influence and cash for 
honours scandals, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and accompanying Dodgy Dossier, the 
Hutton inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly and the 
use of major events like 9/11 to try and bury bad news. At a time when the word politics 
has come to be associated with such words as scandal, sleaze and spin civil libertarians 
may feel that they have particular reason to feel disillusioned. Important victories in 
court cases involving anti-terrorism legislation have invariably been followed by 
Parliamentary or executive-led counter-challenges. The House of Lords’ decision that 
the indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects was unlawful1 was followed by the 
introduction of control orders, which applied to nationals and non-nationals alike. The 
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 A (& others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. 
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practical upshot of the House of Lords’ decision that the control orders in the JJ case2 
had been made unlawfully and so should be quashed was that the Government reduced 
the curfew period in the most onerous orders from 18 to 16 hours (JCHR 2008). And the 
Government’s response to the ruling in AF (No 3)3 was similarly “passive and minimalist” 
and not in keeping with the spirit of the decision (JCHR 2010: 18). Unsurprisingly, those 
concerned to promote and protect human rights have responded by emphasising the 
important role played by the judiciary. Aileen Kavanagh has commented that “More 
than any other factor, the legislative and executive response to terrorism post-9/11 
must make uncomfortable reading for those who urge us to place our faith in 
parliamentary politics as a sure way of protecting rights in times of crisis” (2009b: 131). 
Even Conor Gearty has called on civil libertarians to “swallow whatever suspicions they 
might have had of the judges (‘right-wing’; ‘reactionary’; ‘illiberal’ etc) and recognise 
that the authoritarian tendency has made such advances recently that the judges have 
found themselves in the front line of the defence of freedom” (2007: 115). The focus of 
this article is on how civil libertarians should respond to this disillusionment. 
Rights are statements of political conflict (Griffith 1979; Waldron 1999; Nicol 2006). 
They “express the resolution within society of situations of conflict between the 
interests of different members of society” (Halpin 1997: 264), and their value lies in 
their potential to “provide us with an understanding of the way in which the interests of 
individuals need to be justified as entitlements as against the interests of other 
individuals” (266). So determining the scope or stringency of particular rights is not an 
abstract exercise in logic or reason; it is an essentially political task. Recognition of this 
fact lies at the heart of dialogic theories of the Human Rights Act. These theories tend to 
be based around the courts’ power to issue a declaration of incompatibility (Klug 2001; 
Clayton 2004; Nicol 2006; cf. Sales 2011). When a court issues a declaration of 
incompatibility, it generates a dialogue with other governmental institutions. Parliament 
will consider how, if at all, to respond to the declaration, and any response will then 
itself be subject to further judicial scrutiny. Importantly, genuine dialogue requires that 
the courts do not have an “interpretative monopoly” (Nicol 2006: 742). Genuine 
dialogue requires that the resolution of rights conflicts is a common enterprise. 
Other forms of dialogue, not involving a declaration of incompatibility, are also possible 
under the Human Rights Act (Hickman 2005). This article focuses on one such example: 
the case law and legislation surrounding the role of the courts in the imposition of 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). The courts’ role in the 
imposition of control orders was fiercely debated prior to the enactment of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, was the subject of litigation during the control order 
era, and was debated once again during the Parliamentary debates on (what is now) the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA). Underlying this 
debate were three key questions: 
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i. Whether to view TPIMs from the perspective of security or the perspective of 
liberty; 
ii. How we should conceive the executive and the courts, the two institutions which 
could be entrusted with the power to issue TPIMs; and 
iii. The empirical question of how the competence is actually exercised by 
whichever institution is doing so. 
The first two questions raise a problem that I will refer to as “normative duality”.4 Often 
it is possible to present an entity in contrasting ways, selectively emphasising or 
neglecting particular attributes to fit a particular purpose. A person’s choice of 
presentation will flow from their normative position. The first of the three questions 
listed above is a good example. TPIMs may be presented as being primarily a security 
measure which has incidental effects on liberty. Alternatively, they may be presented as 
being primarily a restriction on liberty which is imposed for the sake of security. How 
one resolves this dualism will be determined by one’s underlying purpose. 
The second of the three questions also raises the problem of normative duality. Each 
institution has both positive and negative associations. Whilst the courts are associated 
with neutrality, consistency and reasoned elaboration of determinations, they can also 
be portrayed as conservative, arcane and removed from political accountability. The 
executive, on the other hand, is associated with democratic accountability and 
legitimacy, but can also be presented as subjective, irrational, populist and majoritarian 
tyranny. The attributes which someone chooses to emphasise will flow from their 
normative standpoint. Someone who believes the Home Secretary should impose TPIMs 
is hardly likely to present the executive as biased and arbitrary, just as someone who 
believes that the responsibility should be vested in the courts will not emphasise the 
judiciary’s lack of political accountability. 
The third question focuses on institutional behaviour, examining how the institutions 
themselves resolve these two dualities. This empirical investigation necessarily feeds 
back into the two previous questions. As is well-known, the UK courts have traditionally 
deferred to the executive in matters involving national security. Whilst the courts 
adopted this attitude of deference it was very difficult, if not impossible, to argue that 
anti-terrorism powers should be viewed primarily as liberty-restricting measures which 
needed close scrutiny from an independent judiciary, for the courts themselves did not 
regard either the powers or their own role in this way. But, as we shall see shortly, the 
tide is now turning. 
The article examines these three questions using a legal realist framework. Employing 
Brian Leiter’s “philosophical reconstruction of Legal Realism” (Leiter 1997: 275), it shows 
that legal reasoning can be deployed in support of either resolution of both the 
security/liberty duality and the institutional duality dilemmas. In short, legal reasoning is 
rationally indeterminate and an inescapably political choice has to be made between 
the different possible outcomes. However, the article goes on to explain that legal 
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realism is not reductionist. There is a distinctive mode of legal reasoning which, together 
with the broader extra-legal influences that operate upon judges, results in consistency 
and predictability. The case law on judicial scrutiny of control orders provides a good 
example. 
By highlighting the nature of law as an unfinished practice, the legal realist framework 
opens up discussion of the two ways in which civil libertarians might respond to their 
disillusionment with Parliamentary politics. The first way juxtaposes the courts (as 
protectors of liberty) with Parliament and the executive (as those who jeopardise 
liberty). This approaches depicts a malevolent Parliament and executive, whose 
attempts to erode individual rights are frustrated only by the protective efforts of the 
courts. Such a depiction is not only unduly simplistic (for a start, it was Parliament that 
introduced the Human Rights Act) but also counterproductive, for it resigns itself to 
Parliament and the executive always resolving both the security/liberty and the 
institutional duality dilemmas in a manner that is detrimental to individual rights. Civil 
libertarians’ second possible response is to recognise that for stable protection of 
individual rights some sort of concordance between the different arms of government is 
necessary. This is illustrated by TPIMA’s provisions on judicial scrutiny of TPIMs. For 
whilst Parliament accepted that the courts should subject TPIMs to intense scrutiny, it 
refused to recognise this in the wording of the legislation. In terms of both the 
security/liberty and the institutional duality dilemmas, this represents a missed 
opportunity to secure political endorsement of a rights-based resolution of these 
dualities. This is a vivid demonstration of how important it is that those concerned to 
protect and promote human rights eschew a negative view of politics and engage fully 
with political processes and debate. 
 
Who should impose TPIMs? Issues of normative duality 
In December 2011 the control order regime was replaced with a new system of TPIMs, 
governed by TPIMA. The principal changes made by the new system were: the ending of 
forced relocation; a new two year maximum duration (save in cases where fresh 
evidence comes to light); and an increase in the standard of proof from reasonable 
suspicion to reasonable belief of involvement in terrorism-related activity. The 
significance of these changes is a matter of dispute. While the Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation has insisted that the TPIMs system is “a new rather than a 
rebadged model” (Anderson 2012: 10), others have suggested that the changes 
constitute mere “rebranding” (Middleton 2011). 
The procedure for imposing TPIMs is more or less unchanged from the procedure for 
imposing a control order. The Home Secretary may impose TPIMs on an individual if the 
five conditions listed in section 3 of TPIMA are satisfied (conditions A – E). Condition E is 
that the Home Secretary has received prior permission from the High Court5 (save 
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where she reasonably considers that the urgency of the case requires TPIMs to be 
imposed without prior permission6). At the permission hearing – which may take place 
in the absence of the individual, without the individual having had an opportunity to 
make representations to the court and/or having been notified of the application (s 
6(4)) – the court’s function is to determine whether the Home Secretary’s decision that 
conditions A – D are met is obviously flawed (s 6(3)(a)), applying the “principles 
applicable on an application for judicial review” (s 6(6)).7 Once the TPIM notice has been 
served on the individual the court must hold a directions hearing, at which it will give 
directions for a review hearing (s 8). The review hearing must be held as soon as 
reasonably practicable (s 8(5)). 
At the review hearing the function of the court is to review the Home Secretary’s 
decision that conditions A – D were met and continue to be met (s 9(1)), again applying 
the “principles applicable on an application for judicial review” (s 9(2)). At the review 
hearing the court has the power to quash the TPIM notice or specified measures within 
it and the power to direct the Home Secretary to revoke the TPIM notice or modify 
specified measures within it (s 9(5)). Although the hearing may include closed sessions – 
during which the interests of the individual are represented by a special advocate 
(paragraph 10 of schedule 4) – the House of Lords held in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v AF (No. 3) that the individual must be given “sufficient information 
about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation 
to those allegations”. If “the open material consists purely of general assertions and the 
case against the controlee is based solely or to a decisive degree on closed materials the 
requirements of a fair trial will not be satisfied, however cogent the case based on the 
closed materials may be”.8 This requirement was subsequently held to apply to all 
control orders, including so-called light-touch orders,9 and the Government confirmed 
that it would apply to TPIMs proceedings.10 
The roles of the courts and the Home Secretary in imposing TPIMs proved contentious 
during the Parliamentary debates on TPIMA. Some argued quite vociferously that the 
Home Secretary should not be empowered to issue TPIMs, but should instead apply to 
the courts for TPIMs to be imposed. At the heart of the debate were four sets of issues: 
expertise; democratic accountability; separation of powers; and, adjudicatory fairness. 
The third of these raises the question whether TPIMs should be viewed from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Home Secretary reasonably considers that TPIMs are necessary to protect members of the public from a 
risk of terrorism; and, the Home Secretary reasonably considers that it is necessary to impose the 
specified TPIMs on the individual to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related 
activity. 
6
 In such cases the TPIM notice must include a statement of urgency, and must be referred to the court 
immediately after it is served: see schedule 2. 
7
 If the decision that condition A, B or C is met is obviously flawed, the court may refuse permission (s 
6(7)). If the decision that condition D is met is obviously flawed the court may give permission but give 
directions as to suitable measures (s 6(9)). 
8
 [2009] UKHL 28, [59] per Lord Phillips. 
9
 R (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home Department) v BC [2009] EWHC 2927 (Admin). 
10
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perspective of security or liberty, whilst the other three raise the question how we 
should conceive the executive and the courts. Examining these four sets of issues also 
reveals how the courts themselves now resolve the two dilemmas of normative duality. 
The first set of issues is expertise. There are a number of civil preventative orders which 
are not imposed by the courts (Dennis 2012). A number of these are instead imposed by 
an expert decision maker or tribunal who is best able to assess the future risk posed by 
the individual and the appropriate response to it. Examples include statutory nuisance 
abatement notices, noise warning notices and planning stop notices.11 Posner and 
Vermeule have argued that in matters of national security the executive is not only well-
intentioned (even if occasionally wrong), but also has access to the fullest information 
and expertise. Therefore, as a matter of institutional competence, judges (who are 
“amateurs playing at security policy” (31)) should defer to the executive’s balancing of 
security and liberty during emergencies (Posner and Vermeule 2007). This certainly 
resonates with the UK courts’ traditional deference to the executive in matters involving 
national security. Even in the House of Lords’ landmark decision in A v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department12 the Law Lords were alarmingly deferential on the question 
whether there existed a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (Tomkins 
2010b). 
During the Parliamentary debates on TPIMA the Government insisted that “it must 
always be appropriate for the Secretary of State to frame the terms of the measure, 
given his or her role for national security and the expertise in their Department”.13 
However, there are two difficulties with this. First, the Home Secretary’s claim to 
relevant expertise must be treated with caution. Although the executive has greater 
access to expert evidence, experience has shown that this is commonly interpreted 
through a political lens, resulting in mistaken risk assessments (Ramraj 2005). Moreover, 
“the fact that Ministers function primarily in the realms of politics increases the danger 
that irrelevant considerations will be taken into account when acting in the ‘quasi-
judicial’ context of a politician dabbling with the rights of individuals” (Walker 2010: 14-
15). Noting examples of cases in which the executive has proven to be far from well-
intentioned, Walker adds that claims to expertise appear feeble given that two “recent 
holders of the office of Home Secretary have been disarmingly but abjectly apologetic 
about their fitness for office” (14). Second, in recent years the courts have “developed a 
particular expertise and body of knowledge in this area of national security, among a 
small and experienced body of judges who hear these cases”.14 Significantly, the courts 
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 See, respectively: part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990; the Noise Act 1996; and, part VII of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1991. The first two are issued by Environmental Health Officers, and 
the third by Planning Officers. Other examples include Remediation Notices for contaminated land (part 
IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990) and notices controlling noise on construction sites (section 
60 of the Control of Pollution Act 1974). 
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 [2004] UKHL 56. 
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Sitting col 221 30 June 2011 (James Brokenshire). 
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themselves have come to recognize this expertise. The Supreme Court has stated that 
the nominated judges who heard control order cases are “properly to be regarded as 
expert tribunals in this difficult and sensitive field”.15 As the courts have developed this 
expertise they have subjected claims made in the name of national security to 
increasing levels of scrutiny, a trend which has been described as the “judicialisation of 
intelligence” (Walker 2011). 
The second issue is democratic accountability. When former Home Secretary Charles 
Clarke first proposed the creation of the control order in 2005, democratic 
accountability was one of the principal justifications given for vesting the power to issue 
orders in the executive. He insisted that “Decisions in this area are properly for the 
executive, who are fully accountable to Parliament for their actions”.16 Six years later 
this same reasoning was deployed in the Parliamentary debates on TPIMA. “[The 
decision to impose TPIMs] should be made by a Minister responsible for national 
security, accountable to Parliament and the electorate, and open to challenge in the 
media”17 claimed one peer, who continued: 
 
“Such a decision is subject to scrutiny by and in the courts but it is the Secretary 
of State who should make the decision. The Government, not the courts, will be 
held accountable for the top priority of protecting the public from terrorism. 
Governments, not judges, pay the price for failing to protect the nation from 
terrorism, and people look to their Government, not the courts, to protect them 
from acts of terrorism”18 
 
However, this argument is double-edged. Whilst it is possible to emphasise the 
democratic legitimacy that emanates from political accountability, it is equally possible 
to emphasise the risk of subjectivity, irrationality, populism and majoritarian tyranny. 
Indeed, when the control order was first proposed the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights noted that both Charles Clarke and Tony Blair had been candid in admitting that 
they did not “want it to be possible for them to be accused of not doing more to protect 
the public in the event of a terrorist attack succeeding” (JCHR 2005: 6-7). Far from 
providing a reason why someone should be empowered to impose control orders (or 
TPIMs), the Committee suggested that this attitude, known colloquially within US 
government as CYA – cover your ass (Lustik 2006) – is in fact a good reason why the 
Home Secretary should not be the one to decide whether an order should be imposed. 
Furthermore, it is hard to see why entrusting the courts with the power to issue TPIMs 
would negate the Home Secretary’s democratic accountability. The Home Secretary 
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would retain the responsibility to apply for a TPIMs notice in cases where one is 
necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism, and would be responsible for 
ensuring that the application is sufficiently well-prepared to withstand the independent 
scrutiny of the courts. Should she fail in either of these duties, the electorate and the 
media would no doubt call her to account. 
Third are a set of issues surrounding the nature of the decision to impose TPIMs and the 
separation of powers. Decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of 
national security have traditionally been regarded as a matter of policy, to be decided 
not by judges but by the executive.19 The Coalition Government’s counter-terrorism 
review concluded that imposing TPIMs is an executive action relating to national 
security (Home Office 2011), a view echoed by the former Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile: 
 
“It seems to me that there is some confusion here among my noble friends and 
other noble Lords in their analysis of the roles of different parts of the state 
apparatus in the conduct of state business. In my judgment, for what little it is 
worth, the act of making a TPIM or a control order has exactly the character of 
ministerial responsibility that successive Home Secretaries … are able to carry 
out. What follows has exactly the character of judicial scrutiny which judges are 
extremely well able to carry out and are experienced in carrying out. It seems to 
me to be a clear part of our constitutional settlement and to fit within it very 
clearly”20 
 
Others focussed instead on the effect TPIMs have on individual liberty. The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights argued strongly that since TPIMs interfere severely with 
individuals’ liberty they should require prior judicial authorisation (2011). Lord Lloyd 
tabled an amendment to this effect at the Lords Committee stage, stating that “It is 
wrong in principle for punitive restrictions of the kind set out [in TPIMA] to be imposed 
on a British subject by a member of the Executive in time of peace. It is as simple as 
that”.21 But, in spite of some impassioned speeches in support of the amendment, it was 
withdrawn. 
So here we encounter the security/liberty duality dilemma. While for some the decision 
to issue TPIMs is a national security decision best suited to the executive, for others it is 
a grave incursion on individual liberty most suitable for judicial determination. Similarly, 
when critics drew parallels with other civil orders which are imposed by the courts – 
such as anti-social behaviour orders, serious crime prevention orders, gang injunctions 
                                                 
19
 See, for example, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153. 
20
 Hansard HL Deb vol 731 col 301 19 October 2011 (Lord Carlile). 
21
 Hansard HL Deb vol 731 col 291 19 October 2011 (Lord Lloyd). 
 9 
and risk of sexual harm orders22 – the Government pointed instead to other national 
security measures such as deportation, terrorist asset-freezing and financial restrictions 
which are imposed by the Home Secretary. The choice of analogy tended to follow the 
normative position, not the other way around. 
One’s normative position can also determine how one construes the demands of the 
separation of powers. In Thomas v Mowbray23 the High Court of Australia considered in 
detail whether the power to impose a control order is properly regarded as a judicial 
power, in order to decide whether the control order regime infringed the constitutional 
separation of powers. In contrast to the UK Government, the Australian Government 
defended the constitutional validity of the regime by arguing that the power to issue 
control orders is, by its nature, judicial power. The Court accepted this argument by a 
majority of five to two. It explained that there are other examples of judicial power 
which create new rights and obligations (as opposed to adjudicating existing ones), and 
that there is no rigid rule that restrictions of liberty (falling short of a deprivation of 
liberty) may only be imposed by judicial order following an adjudication of criminal guilt. 
The Court then went on to hold that the legislation does not require the Australian 
courts to exercise judicial power in a manner that is inconsistent with the nature of 
judicial power. Here the majority emphasised that the criteria for making an order are 
not inherently too vague, since judges are familiar with such concepts as “reasonably 
necessary”, and stressed that confirmation hearings take place in open court, applying 
the rules of evidence, with an opportunity for cross-examination and the burden of 
proof resting on the applicant.24  
In the UK critics of control orders/TPIMs have called for greater judicial involvement, 
urging that imposing these measures is a “normal judicial function” (Fenwick and 
Phillipson 2011: 894). In Australia, on the other hand, critics of control orders lamented 
the High Court’s decision that the power to issue control orders is judicial in nature. In 
their eyes, whether a control order should be imposed in a particular case is a question 
of policy. Requiring judges to decide such questions brings executive functions under 
the judicial umbrella, which in the longer term will cause (real or perceived) damage to 
judicial independence (Fairall and Lacey 2007). In response to such concerns, Gleeson CJ 
stated at the end of his judgment: 
 
“[T]he argument for the plaintiff is that the power involved in making anti-
terrorist control orders is exclusively non-judicial and, in its nature, antithetical 
                                                 
22
 See, respectively: Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Serious Crime Act 2007; Police and Crime Act 2009; and, 
Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
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Crennan JJ was more circumspect on this point, given the possibility of withholding documents in the 
interests of national security ([122]-[125]). 
 10 
to the judicial function ... The corollary appears to be that it can only be 
exercised by the executive branch of government.  The advantages, in terms of 
protecting human rights, of such a conclusion are not self-evident” ([17]) 
 
Whilst this passage appears to be at odds with the tenor of the rest of Gleeson CJ’s 
judgment, and with some of the other majority judges’ criticisms of the celebrated 
decision in the Communist Party case,25 it does resonate with rights-based criticisms of 
TPIMs in the UK. As we shall see below, in this country the courts made it clear that 
Article 6(1) ECHR applied to all control order review hearings, including light-touch 
orders, since control orders invariably imposed restrictions on an individual’s civil rights 
and obligations.26 To meet the demands of Article 6(1) the courts subjected government 
decisions to intense scrutiny, even where they concerned national security. Turning the 
traditional view of the separation of powers on its head, they insisted that “If national 
security has to come to court, it follows not that the courts have to give way to claims 
made in the name of national security, but that claims made in the name of national 
security have to give way if they cannot satisfy the court” (Tomkins 2010a: 567). 
However the courts might once have resolved the security/liberty dualism dilemma, 
today it seems clear that courts in TPIMs review hearings regard the measures as 
primarily a restriction on liberty, imposed for the sake of security. 
The fourth and final issue is adjudicatory fairness. Being unelected, judges enjoy an 
independence that the Home Secretary does not. Normative duality means that it is 
possible to present judicial decision-making in a negative light, as conservative, arcane 
and removed from political accountability. Conversely, it has been suggested that 
entrusting the courts with the power to issue TPIMs would in fact have some important 
benefits: 
 
“It is in constitutional principle correct for courts to handle the individual 
imposition of national security requirements. The judges also enjoy the 
advantages of forensic training and political independence which may result in 
improved decision-making and public confidence compared to the attributes of 
politicians” (Walker and Horne 2012: 432) 
 
These concerns are particularly pertinent when considering a regime like TPIMs. Not 
only will TPIMs often be highly restrictive of individuals’ liberty, but experience tells us 
that in practice they are likely to be used almost exclusively against members of Muslim 
communities (Simcox 2010). The legitimacy of the process for imposing TPIMs in the 
                                                 
25
 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. See in particular the judgment of 
Callinan J at [530]-[533], [582]-[585], [589]. 
26
 R (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home Department) v BC [2009] EWHC 2927 (Admin). 
 11 
eyes of these communities is important in avoiding alienation and resentment, both of 
which would be counter-productive. 
So there are contrasting resolutions of the security/liberty and institutional duality 
dilemmas. On the one hand the power to impose TPIMs may be presented as a matter 
of national security, best suited to the expertise of the Home Secretary who – unlike the 
judiciary – is democratically accountable. On the other hand it may be presented as a 
grave incursion on individual liberty, best suited to the independent scrutiny of those 
judges with expertise in this area. Which of these perspectives should we embrace? 
Answering this question is a political task. The liberal-legalist suggestion “that we ought 
to be able to find the answer to all political disputes in law” (Tomkins 2002: 172) has 
rightly been debunked. As the following two sections explain, even legal decisions on 
this issue have an inescapably political dimension. 
 
Rational indeterminacy and the MB jurisprudence 
Legal realism is often wrongly presented as the antithesis of legal formalism (Tamanaha 
2009). It is popularly understood as suggesting that judges decide cases according to 
their personal preferences and then construct legal reasoning to justify their chosen 
outcome. An influential example is chapter VII of Hart’s The Concept of Law, entitled 
“Formalism and Rule-Scepticism,” which rendered legal realism “a philosophical joke in 
the English-speaking world” (Leiter 1997: 270). In this chapter Hart examined “the claim 
that talk of rules is a myth, cloaking the truth that law consists simply of the decisions of 
courts and the prediction of them” (Hart 1961: 133). This claim was easily refuted by 
Hart, since it misses something important about our concept of law. When judges must 
render a decision, they set out to discover the relevant law. If the claim were correct, 
then setting out to discover the relevant law would mean no more than the judge asking 
herself what she thinks she will do. This is “manifestly ridiculous” (Leiter 2007: 70).27 
Leiter has explained that Hart’s chapter identifies two forms of rule-scepticism: 
conceptual rule-scepticism; and, empirical rule-scepticism (Leiter 2007). The rule-
scepticism described in the previous paragraph is conceptual rule-scepticism, for it 
denies that rules previously enacted by legislatures or articulated by courts are law. 
Leiter also distinguishes two branches of legal realism: the sociological wing and the 
idiosyncratic wing (Leiter 1997). Only the idiosyncratic wing – exemplified by Jerome 
Frank – embraces conceptual rule-scepticism. Frank claimed that prediction of judicial 
decisions is largely impossible. A judge’s response to the facts of a particular case is 
determined by idiosyncratic facts about the personality or psychology of the particular 
judge. This was summed up by his formula: “the Stimuli affecting the judge x the 
Personality of the judge = Decisions” (Frank 1931: 242, emphasis original). Although 
Frank’s view was a minority one, even amongst realists (as Frank himself recognised), it 
                                                 
27
 The claim is also unable to account for the fact that sometimes we want to say that a court has made a 
mistake as to the law. If law is just a prediction of what a court will hold, there is no conceptual space left 
to question whether the court misunderstood the law (Leiter 2007: 70). 
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is often taken as the essence of realism (Leiter 1997). This “Frankification” of legal 
realism does not do justice to the majority of legal realists, for it misleadingly saddles 
the sociological wing of realism with claims of judicial volition and judicial idiosyncrasy 
(Leiter 1997: 269). 
Hart himself recognised that legal rules cannot be fully determinate. However smoothly 
particular precedents or statutes work in the majority of cases, they “will, at some point 
where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has 
been termed an open texture” (Hart 1961: 124, emphasis original). Termed empirical 
rule-scepticism by Leiter, Hart explains that it “amounts to the contention that, so far as 
the courts are concerned, there is nothing to circumscribe the area of open texture: so 
that it is false, if not senseless, to regard judges as themselves subject to rules or 
‘bound’ to decide cases as they do” (Hart 1961: 135). According to Hart, such 
indeterminacy plays a relatively minor role in judicial decision-making and operates only 
“at the margin” (Hart 1961: 132). By contrast, the realists’ claims of the indeterminacy 
of law were based not on the limits of language but on the existence of different, 
potentially conflicting, methods of interpreting sources of law. There might be differing 
views on the specificity of the ratio decidendi of a particular precedent. There might be 
differing views on which approach to take to interpreting a statute – contrast the literal, 
mischief and golden rules – with the different approaches yielding different results. And, 
in today’s Human Rights Act era, there might be differing views on whether a statute 
can be read down in order to render it compliant with Convention rights or whether it is 
necessary to issue a declaration of incompatibility. The realists thus give us “an 
additional reason (beyond Hart’s) to expect indeterminacy in law” (Leiter 2007: 75-76, 
emphasis original). Leiter accordingly concludes that the disagreement between Hart 
and the realists is a “disagreement as to degree” (Leiter 2007: 78, emphasis original). At 
the same time, however, he stresses that the realists’ view was “not that all primary 
rules are indeterminate” (Leiter 2007: 79, emphasis original). The realists’ focus was 
appellate litigation, which comprises only a small proportion of the total number of 
instantiations of any rule. Their central claim was that, at the stage of appellate review, 
legal rules are not the determining factor in a large number of cases.  
The jurisprudence on the courts’ role in imposing control orders illustrates the realists’ 
claim that legal reasons are often insufficient to justify a unique outcome. In one of the 
first High Court cases under the control order regime, Re MB,28 Sullivan J concluded that 
review hearings violated the Article 6(1) ECHR right to a fair hearing. Importantly, he 
interpreted the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 as only requiring the court to review 
whether the Home Secretary’s decision that the statutory conditions were met was 
flawed at the time of the decision, and not also at the time of the review hearing. This 
meant the court’s supervisory role was very limited. Control orders were made by the 
executive, not the court, and although prior permission was required the order could be 
made without notice to or consultation with the individual concerned. Since the court 
had to judge the Home Secretary’s decision by reference to the information that was 
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 [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin). 
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available at the time of the decision, it could not have regard to any subsequent 
information or explanation from the individual or special advocate. Add to this the low 
standard of proof and the possibility of closed sessions, and the result according to 
Sullivan J was a “procedure which is uniquely unfair” ([85]). Issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility, he stated: 
 
“The court would be failing in its duty under the 1998 [Human Rights] Act, a duty 
imposed upon the court by Parliament, if it did not say, loud and clear, that the 
procedure under the Act whereby the court merely reviews the lawfulness of the 
Secretary of State’s decision to make the order upon the basis of the material 
available to him at that earlier stage are conspicuously unfair. The thin veneer of 
legality which is sought to be applied by section 3 of the [Prevention of 
Terrorism] Act cannot disguise the reality. That controlees’ rights under the 
Convention are being determined not by an independent court in compliance 
with Article 6.1, but by executive decision-making, untrammelled by any 
prospect of effective judicial supervision” ([103]) 
 
When the case subsequently reached the Court of Appeal, in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v MB,29 the Home Secretary challenged this declaration of 
incompatibility. The submissions made by counsel for the Home Secretary and MB in 
this case reflected the contrasting perspectives set out in the previous section. Counsel 
for the Home Secretary submitted that imposing a control order is primarily a measure 
taken to safeguard national security. Any impact on individual liberty is incidental. 
Decisions taken to safeguard national security are within the province of the executive, 
not the courts, and whilst they may be reviewed by the courts they are not an 
appropriate subject for a full appeal on the merits. By contrast, counsel for MB argued 
that national security considerations cannot displace the Article 6(1) right to a fair 
hearing. Judicial review is insufficient to satisfy the dictates of Article 6(1); the court 
must be empowered to make its own decision whether an order should be imposed. 
Faced with these submissions, Lord Phillips CJ reached a quite different conclusion to 
Sullivan J. He explained that, notwithstanding the “natural meaning of the [statutory] 
wording”, there were “cogent reasons” for interpreting the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
differently ([42]). Stressing the Court’s duty to interpret legislation, so far as possible, in 
a manner which is compatible with Convention rights, he adopted a “purposive 
approach” ([44]). Such an approach requires “the court to consider whether the 
continuing decision of the Secretary of State to keep the order in force is flawed” ([44]). 
At a review hearing the court must therefore consider both whether the Home 
Secretary’s decision was flawed at the time of the decision and whether it is flawed at 
the time of the hearing.30 
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 Confirmed in BM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 366. 
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Turning to the statutory conditions for the imposition of a control order, Lord Phillips CJ 
distinguished between a finding of fact (which Article 6 may require to be carried out by 
a judicial officer) and a decision based on policy or expediency (where the court’s role 
may be limited to reviewing the fairness and legality of the decision) ([56]). Looking first 
at the requirement that there must have been reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the individual had been involved in terrorism-related activity he concluded that this is an 
“objective question of fact” ([60]), adding that it is hard to see how a court could review 
the Home Secretary’s decision without forming its own view of whether there were 
reasonable grounds for suspicion. He therefore accepted that the court must make “its 
own independent assessment” ([54]) of whether this condition was satisfied. As for the 
next condition – that a control order was necessary to protect the public from a risk of 
terrorism – Lord Phillips CJ conceded that a degree of deference must be paid to the 
decision of the Home Secretary, but nonetheless concluded that “there will be scope for 
the court to give intense scrutiny to the necessity for each of the obligations imposed on 
an individual under a control order, and it must do so” ([65]). In addition, where an 
individual obligation is particularly onerous or intrusive, the court should explore 
alternative means of achieving the same result. 
So when faced with the security/liberty duality dilemma in MB, neither Sullivan J nor 
Lord Phillips CJ accepted counsel for the Home Secretary’s argument that issuing a 
control order was primarily a national security matter within the discretion of the 
executive. Although national security was regarded as a matter for the executive, with 
very limited judicial oversight, throughout the twentieth century, the starting point for 
both Sullivan J and Lord Phillips CJ was that review hearings must comply with Article 6 
since control orders interfere with an individual’s civil rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights has held that, where an adjudicatory body determining a dispute over 
civil rights and obligations does not comply with Article 6(1) in some respect, there will 
be no violation of the Convention if the proceedings before that body are subject to 
subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the 
guarantees of Article 6(1).31 So although the initial decision to impose a control order 
involves a prima facie violation of Article 6(1) – since the Home Secretary is not an 
independent and impartial tribunal – this can be cured by the subsequent review 
hearing, provided that the reviewing court has full jurisdiction. 
Having identified the demands of Article 6(1), the next question was whether to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility or, alternatively, to invoke the interpretative obligation 
set out in the Human Rights Act, effectively rewrite the legislation and hold that the 
courts should “treat the review as an appeal on the merits of the case”.32 In contrast to 
the more literal approach of Sullivan J – who emphasised the wording of section 3(10) of 
the 2005 Act and gave these words their natural meaning – Lord Phillips CJ opted to 
“read down” the provisions of the 2005 Act ([46]). There is no doubt that this was “not 
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what Parliament intended when it passed the 2005 Act” (Tomkins 2010a: 555).33 
Admittedly the obligation to interpret legislation, so far as possible, in a way which is 
compatible with Convention rights was placed on the courts by Parliament when it 
passed the Human Rights Act. Subsequent case law has established that the courts may, 
in the exercise of this interpretative obligation, modify the effect of statutory provisions, 
go against parliamentary intent, and read in and read down if this would render 
legislation ECHR-compatible (Kavanagh 2009a). There comes a point, however, where a 
choice must be made between a bold use of the interpretative obligation and a 
declaration of incompatibility. The degree of departure from the statutory wording is an 
important consideration here, but has not always proved determinative.34 The 
declaration of incompatibility issued by Sullivan J would have left Parliament to decide 
whether or not to increase the level of judicial scrutiny in order to achieve Article 6 
compliance. The Court of Appeal chose instead to utilise the courts’ interpretative 
obligation and make the decision itself. 
As the following table summarises, in MB distinctively legal reasons were advanced in 
support of four different outcomes: 
 
 Role of the courts 
Supervisory jurisdiction Merits appeal (or equivalent) 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
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n
d
er
 H
u
m
an
 R
ig
h
ts
 A
ct
 
Declaration of 
incompatibility 
High Court 
(Sullivan J) 
Counsel for MB 
(in Court of Appeal) 
ECHR compliant 
(using 
interpretative 
obligation if 
necessary) 
Counsel for Home 
Secretary 
(in Court of Appeal) 
Court of Appeal 
(Leading judgment: 
Lord Phillips CJ) 
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 Similar statements have also been made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (2011) and by the 
courts themselves. In R (on the application of Secretary of State for the Home Department) v BC [2009] 
EWHC 2927 (Admin), Collins J stated candidly that section 3(10) of the 2005 Act “does not mean what 
Parliament intended it to mean” ([72]). 
34
 See, for example, R v A [2002] 1 AC 45 and R (Hammond) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
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In cases like this, where the law is rationally indeterminate, politics plays an important 
part. Legal reasoning alone did not require the Court of Appeal to utilise the courts’ 
interpretative obligation instead of issuing a declaration of incompatibility. Similarly, 
legal reasons could have been used to justify a different resolution of the 
security/liberty duality dilemma. Both decisions had an inescapably political dimension. 
 
Avoiding reductionism: the post-MB case law 
Having recognised that legal reasoning from legal materials alone is often rationally 
indeterminate, it is important to avoid the opposite extreme and allow law to be 
subsumed by politics. Properly understood, legal realism is not reductionist. The 
sociological wing of realism – exemplified by the writings of Llewellyn, Oliphant and 
Moore – did not claim that judicial decisions are based on the idiosyncrasies of 
individual judges. In contrast to the extreme, Frankified form of legal realism which 
depicts judicial decisions as utterly unpredictable, one of the most familiar themes in 
the sociological wing (the predominant wing) was the interest in predicting judicial 
decisions (Leiter 2007: 25). The thesis of the sociological wing was that social forces 
operate upon judges, leading them to respond to facts in similar, and predictable, ways. 
To predict judicial decisions it is necessary to identify the psycho-socio facts about 
judges which cause their decisions to fall into predictable patterns (Leiter 2003). Much 
of the emerging empirical work on judicial behaviour may accordingly be understood “as 
a new generation of legal realism” (Miles and Sunstein 2008: 834). It follows that realists 
from the sociological wing cannot have been conceptual rule-sceptics. The claim that 
the class of legal reasons is rationally indeterminate presupposes the existence of 
distinctively legal (as opposed to non-legal) reasons. The realist arguments for 
indeterminacy which focus on the potentially conflicting, but equally legitimate, ways 
lawyers have of interpreting statutes and precedents presupposes a distinctive form of 
legal reasoning. So, far from being reductionist, the sociological wing of realism was 
based on a non-sceptical account of the concept of law – one with “distinct affinities to 
that developed by the Legal Positivists!” (Leiter 2007: 72). 
Support for the thesis of the sociological wing can be found in the post-MB case law on 
judicial scrutiny of control orders. As the following examples illustrate, there is a 
consistency and regularity which runs throughout this case law.35 This has had a 
significant impact in practice, and in turn forms part of a broader trend within the lower 
courts to “insist that, in proceedings before them, government decisions should be 
robustly reviewed even where they concern national security” (Tomkins 2010a: 567). 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v GG; Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v NN36 Collins J stated that he was “not persuaded that [NN’s] involvement 
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 In addition to the cases discussed in the main text, see: Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Bullivant [2008] EWHC 337 (Admin); Secretary of State for the Home Department v AT and AW [2009] 
EWHC 512 (Admin); and, BM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 366. 
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in any activities extended beyond a relatively short time in the summer and autumn of 
2005” ([21]). So, three years on, there was “nothing to support” the claim that there 
was a continuing need to maintain a control order ([23]), and the order was quashed. As 
for GG’s control order, although this was upheld Collins J allowed GG’s appeal against a 
modification to his order which had forced him to relocate to Chesterfield. GG’s 
situation had changed – he had married – and his wife and stepchildren had a home in 
Derby. Collins J said that the time had come to allow him to live with his wife, subject to 
restrictions on visitors and on visiting mosques. 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v AV37 Mitting J ordered that a control 
order be revoked. Concluding that there was no real risk that AV would re-launch a 
terrorist campaign in Libya whilst negotiations between the Libyan Government and the 
leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group were ongoing, he held that there was no 
reasonable basis for the decision that it was necessary to continue to impose a control 
order on AV. 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Al Saadi38 Wilkie J held that there were 
reasonable grounds for suspecting AS had attended a terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan, and for suspecting that he had been involved with an extremist group in 
Italy. He nonetheless concluded that although AS “remains disaffected from the state 
and mainstream UK society and may well adhere to a view of Islam with which many 
would feel uncomfortable, this does not of itself justify the degree of intrusion involved 
in a control order indefinitely” ([185]). He recognised that he was not accepting the 
Security Service’s and Home Secretary’s assessment of risk, and that he was reaching a 
different conclusion to the one the Special Immigration Appeals Commission had 
reached two-and-a-half years earlier. Instead, he noted that during the intervening 
period there had been no activity of AS which was evidence of terrorism-related activity 
or of a willingness to re-engage in such and ruled that the order was no longer necessary 
and should be revoked. 
Lastly, CA v Secretary of State for the Home Department.39 CA’s control order had been 
modified to force him to relocate from Crawley to Ipswich. His wife and two children 
attempted to live with him in Ipswich, but the relocation “imposed an unendurable 
strain upon [his wife] and risk[ed] the permanent breakdown of the marriage” ([3]). 
Mitting J stated: 
 
“I believe that, unless CA can resume family life with his wife and children in 
Crawley, there is at least a substantial risk that this otherwise strong marriage 
will fail. Even viewed from the proper, but focussed, viewpoint of minimising the 
risk to the public from terrorism-related activity by CA, that is not a risk which 
should be run. If his marriage fails, he may well become embittered against 
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British authorities and revert to extremist views and actions. What is, in my 
judgment, the most significant constraint upon him doing so would disappear” 
([7]) 
 
He accordingly allowed CA’s appeal against the modification to his control order and 
allowed him to return to Crawley subject to stringent conditions. 
Admittedly, there are some cases in which the courts have appeared more deferential.40 
But even these cases “exhibit a more robust review of the Secretary of State’s decision-
making than would ever have been countenanced [in twentieth century case law]. Thus, 
even the weakest of the control orders cases exemplify a change in the law” (Tomkins 
2010a: 559). In other words, the decisions in cases like MB, GG & NN, AV, Al Saadi and 
CA are not simply the result of particular judges’ idiosyncrasies. They are the product of 
broader social forces, in particular the courts’ changing perspective on the 
security/liberty and institutional duality dilemmas. 
 
TPIMs and the role of the courts 
During the Parliamentary passage of TPIMA the Government explained that the case law 
on judicial scrutiny of control orders should apply to TPIMs review hearings: “It is 
absolutely the case that the Government intend for the same intense level of scrutiny to 
be applied in court reviews of TPIM notices under Clause 9”.41 The guidance notes which 
accompanied the Bill confirmed this, stating that “the enhanced level of scrutiny 
provided by case law, should apply to the replacement system” (15). Yet, in spite of the 
fact that the control orders case law “accommodates significantly more intensive 
scrutiny than is commonly found in practice in judicial review” (House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution 2011: 6), section 9(2) of TPIMA retains the 2005 Act’s 
insistence that the court “must apply the principles applicable on an application for 
judicial review”. This proved contentious during the Parliamentary debates. The House 
of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution asserted that “The TPIMs Bill should be 
clear on its face that in cases concerning TPIM notices the function of the court is not 
limited to ordinary judicial review” (6). The Committee pointed out that a year earlier it 
had made a similar observation in respect of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Bill, 
following which the Bill was amended. As a result section 26 of that Act now clearly 
states that challenges to a designation order constitute a merits appeal. When a similar 
amendment to TPIMA was moved at Lords Committee Stage, however, it was resisted 
by the Government. The Joint Committee on Human Rights stated: 
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“We are astounded that the Government is asking Parliament to re-enact in this 
Bill legislative language to which the courts have given a meaning which is not 
what Parliament originally intended. It is not clear whether Parliament is to be 
assumed by courts to have reasserted its original intention about that language 
by re-enacting it, or is to be assumed to know that the language it is using does 
not mean what it says. Either way, this is not a satisfactory way to legislate to 
ensure human rights compatibility” (2011: 7) 
 
The likelihood of Parliament being taken as having reasserted its original intention 
appears remote. The Government stated clearly, both in Parliament and in the 
explanatory notes, that the previous case law on judicial scrutiny of control orders 
would continue to apply. In any event, the Court of Appeal in MB held that the statutory 
wording should be read down to ensure Article 6 compatibility regardless of legislative 
intent. And the early indications from the courts are that they will continue to apply the 
pre-TPIMA case law, with Collins J stating in Secretary of State for the Home Department 
v BM42 that judicial scrutiny at TPIMs review hearings must be “particularly intense” 
([30]). 
To produce legislation which says one thing but everyone agrees means something else 
is unsatisfactory. What may be attractive about this disparity between the statutory 
wording and the reality of TPIMs review hearings is that it allows the depiction of 
existing arrangements to be adapted to fit the desired purpose. Formally, TPIMs are 
issued by the Home Secretary with the courts exercising a supervisory role applying the 
principles of judicial review. The decision to impose TPIMs may thus be said to lie in the 
hands of the executive, the branch of government which is responsible for national 
security and which, unlike unelected judges, is democratically accountable. But in 
practice the courts treat the review hearing as a merits appeal. This protects individual 
liberty and ensures a fair hearing before an independent tribunal, avoiding the risk of 
populism and irrationality. The Home Secretary can thus claim responsibility for 
imposing TPIMs, whilst knowing that the procedure complies with Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Meanwhile, the courts can subject her decisions to intense scrutiny without being 
accused of acting undemocratically. The statutory wording appeases those who believe 
the Home Secretary should impose TPIMs by acting almost as a fig leaf, concealing the 
perceivedly offensive reality that lies beneath. Whilst this may be politically expedient, it 
lacks intellectual honesty. Having endorsed the decision in MB, Parliament should have 
taken this to its logical conclusion and vested the power to issue TPIMs in the courts. 
 
Conclusion 
The premise of much legal scholarship is that law is capable of achieving determinacy 
over controversy: 
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“Whether we consider the emotive devotion to the Common Law of a lawyer like 
Pollock, or the Herculean intellectual effort to harness the law’s resources 
suggested by Dworkin, or the positivist concern illustrated by Raz to detach the 
pronouncements of the law from moral or political conflict, or even the 
uncritiqued support from the law for a dominant ideology presumed by the 
heterodox scholars – in all these cases the law is regarded as making it possible 
to put forward a view of how society should be organised that has become 
insulated from controversy” (Halpin 2006: 161) 
 
Advancing a legal realist framework, this article has used the case law and legislation 
governing the role of the courts in issuing control orders/TPIMs to challenge this 
assumption. The debate over whether the power to issue TPIMs should be vested in the 
Home Secretary or the courts raised two questions involving normative duality: whether 
TPIMs are primarily a national security measure which have incidental effects on liberty 
or a restriction on liberty imposed for the sake of national security; and how the Home 
Secretary and the courts should be conceived in this context. As we have seen, it is 
possible to construct legal reasoning in support of quite different resolutions of these 
two questions. But whilst the choice between these outcomes/lines of reasoning has an 
inescapably political dimension, the choice is not simply an idiosyncratic one. Decision-
making can be constrained by social, political and institutional constraints, as well as 
legal ones (Hawkins 1992). When legal reasoning is rationally indeterminate, extra-legal 
influences operate upon judges causing their decisions to fall into predictable patterns. 
The decision in MB and the subsequent judicial scrutiny of control orders displays a 
consistent response to the security/liberty and institutional duality dilemmas: TPIMs are 
a grace incursion on individual liberty which must be scrutinised closely in a fair hearing 
before an independent court. This is in keeping with the growing judicialisation of 
intelligence within the lower courts catalysed by the demands of Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Judicial independence is not immune to political climate (Shetreet and Forsyth 2011). 
Commenting on the then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s well-known claim that “the rules of 
the game are changing”, David Bonner has argued that in fact the only rule of the game 
that is changing is the UK courts’ willingness, since the enactment of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, to apply an enhanced level of scrutiny in the area of national security (Bonner 
2007). But whilst there has been progress in the legal realm since the Human Rights Act, 
this is far from being universal. In contrast to the decisions of the lower courts on 
judicial scrutiny of control orders, there have been numerous decisions of the House of 
Lords since its landmark decision in the Belmarsh Detainees case43 which are “at worst 
dismal, at best ambiguous” in terms of their commitment to the protection of individual 
rights (Dyzenhaus 2006: 17; see also Tomkins 2010a). Nor is the progress secure. For 
whilst a legal determination may dull political argument it will not necessarily curtail it. 
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Not only could there be further statutory intervention, as in the case of TPIMs, but 
competing political perspectives could also give rise to further legal challenges which 
attempt to erode the scope the first determination (e.g., the Labour Government’s 
attempt to argue that the AF (No. 3) principle did not apply to light-touch control 
orders44) or which mount an outright challenge to its precedential status (e.g., the U.K.’s 
attempt in Saadi v Italy to overturn the Chahal principle45). 
In the political realm the enhanced level of judicial scrutiny in cases involving national 
security has repeatedly come under attack, with some suggestions that the UK should 
even consider pulling-out of the ECHR. Yet the nature of law as an unfinished practice 
means that for stable protection of individual rights some concordance is required 
between the different arms of government. So for a culture of judicial independence to 
become engrained in cases involving national security it must be promoted and 
nurtured in both the legal and political realms. It is for this reason that the failure to vest 
the power to issue TPIMs in the courts is one of the most regrettable features of TPIMA. 
This failure represents a missed opportunity to secure political endorsement of 
enhanced legal protection of individual liberty. 
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